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Résumé / Abstract
En présence dasymétrie dinformation entre propriétaires (le principal) et administrateurs
(lagent), la relation investissement coût du capital et la relation investissement valeur implicite du
capital subissent une distorsion pour tous les types. Dans un modèle avec coût dajustement par
ailleurs standard, il apparaît notamment un régime dinaction pour une certaine gamme de coûts.
Ce phénomène se présente sous une forme différente de ce quimplique la présence de coûts fixes
ou dirréversibilités, mais ressemble à ce qui survient lorsque le coût du capital est différent pour
une hausse que pour une baisse du stock. Lincertitude, qui prend la forme dun élargissement de
la distribution des types, tend cependant à réduire linvestissement. Le modèle clarifie
linterprétation du q de Tobin sous asymétrie dinformation et explique certains résultats de la
littérature sur les fusions et acquisitions.
We investigate investment behavior when there is asymmetry of information between
owners (the principal) and managers (the agent). The model accepts the standard
cost-of-adjustment model as a particular case and is directly compared with it. For all types,
information asymmetry distorts the relationship between investment and the cost of capital, and
the relationship between investment and the shadow value of capital. In particular, a regime of
inaction appears over a certain cost range, in an observationnally different way than when fixed
adjustment costs, or irreversibilities, cause a similar phenomenon. Uncertainty, in the form of
an increase in the spread of agents types, tends to reduce investment despite symmetric
adjustment cost and perfect competition. The model clarifies the interpretation of Tobins q
under asymmetric information and explains some results of the mergers and acquisition
literature.
Mots clés : Contrats incitatifs ; Dynamique ; Information asymétrique ; Relation
principal-agent ; Investissement ; Incertitude.
Key words: Incentive contracts; Dynamic; Asymmetric information; Principal-agent
relationship; Investment; Cost of adjustment; Uncertainty.
1 Introduction
There is a huge literature on real business investment. It reects the importance of
investment both as a component, and as a determinant, of economic activity. It also
reects the considerable empirical and theoretical diculties associated with the analysis
of capital spending. This literature is exemplied in the survey by Robert Chirinko
(1993), or in the recent paper by Abel and Eberly (1994). In its branch evolving from the
neoclassical tradition, it still largely neglects important issues of agency and information.
Yet, investment, as perhaps the most important business decision, is at the core of the
corporate governance challenge. In the introduction of its 1994 survey of that subject,
The Economist wrote: `: : : managers have become insuciently accountable to share-
holders. From blatant thievery, such as that by Robert Maxwell, to lousy investments
(Japanese rms' purchases of overpriced American property or American Express's at-
tempt to become a nancial conglomerate), to failures to tackle looming problems quickly
enough, as at IBM, there is ample evidence of waste that might have been avoided had
bosses been on a tighter rein.'
To be fair, it should be noted that agency costs, asymmetric information, and cor-
porate control considerations have been extensively studied on the nancial side of the
investment equation (see Harris and Raviv, 1991). However, because of its emphasis
on capital structure and nancial markets, the nance literature has not contributed
directly to investigating the role of such considerations in the determination of real
investment.
Our paper is a contribution toward lling this gap. We introduce asymmetric in-
formation into a standard cost-of-adjustment model of investment, and we derive the
resulting behavior of the investment function. Our model describes a principal-agent
relationship with investors (inside or outside shareholders) as principal, and managers
as the agent. It could also apply to situations involving a regulator as principal, and the
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rm as agent.
Unlike what might have been expected, the incentive compatible investment func-
tion is not merely an attenuation of its full information counterpart, but may involve a
qualitatively dierent behavior for some types. Several results appear surprising at rst
glance, both because they add some hitherto ignored considerations to real investment
decisions and their determinants, and because they illustrate the implications of intro-
ducing dynamic considerations to standard principal-agent models. Thus we nd that
situations may occur where both the low cost, and the high cost, types are asked to carry
out the same investment as they would under full information, if the principal faced the
same shadow price of capital. However, because the shadow price of capital is aected
by informational asymmetry, we nd that the investment behavior of all types must in
fact be modied relative to the full information situation. We also show that investment
behavior under asymmetric information exhibits hysteresis, although for reasons quite
dierent from those described by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Of course, these results de-
pend on the seriousness of informational asymmetries; in contrast with otherwise similar
adjustment cost models (Abel, 1983; Caballero, 1991) an increase in uncertainty, taking
the form of an increase in the spread of types, has a depressing eect on investment.
Our model also casts a new shadow on the q theory of investment. We show that, if
informational asymmetries matter, evaluating the shadow price of capital by market
mechanisms raises a much more serious issue than the well understood problem of the
identity between average and marginal capital value. The relevant rent actually is split
between shareholders and managers, and the stock exchange only provides information
on the share accruing to the formers.
We describe and further motivate the model in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted
to solving the problem of the principal, which is to tell managers what investment to
choose, given their informational advantage and conicting objective. The similarity of
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our basic model with the standard cost of adjustment model allows easy comparisons
with the latter, in particular with the extended model of Abel and Eberly. In Section 4,
we identify and explain the qualitative dierences and similarities in the predictions of
our model and the standard cost of adjustmentmodel. We also discuss the implications of
information asymmetry on the q theory of investment and, more generally, the additional
contribution of our model to major existing models of real business investment.
2 The model
As mentioned earlier, there are several reasons why the objectives of managers and of
shareholders may not coincide, and why managers may have an informational advantage
over shareholders. Harris and Raviv (1991), although with a focus on implications for
capital structure, survey most of them. Since many capital structure decisions aim at
improving real investment decisions, they are relevant to our discussion. The reader is
referred to their paper for details and references.
Conicts between shareholders and managers may arise because managers hold only
part of the residual claim. Rather than devoting themselves entirely to prot enhancing
objectives, they may withhold information about the best investment prospects in order
to promote decisions more favorable to their own personal benets. Another type of
conict may arise because shareholders have an incentive to invest suboptimally under
limited liability: if a project is successful, they capture most of the gain, but if the project
fails, they cannot lose more than their investment. On the other hand, managers may
lose their reputation in a bankruptcy (Diamond, 1989; Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1989).
Similarly, it has been shown by Myers and Majluf (1984) that, if outside investors are
less well-informed than managers about the value of the rm's assets, `then equity may
be mispriced by the market. If an investment is to be nanced by issuing new equity,
underpricing may be so severe that new investors capture more than the net present value
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of the project, resulting in a net loss' (Harris and Raviv, p.306) to insiders, including
managers if they own equity.
These are some of the reasons why shareholders' and managers' objectives may con-
ict. Our model will most directly reect those where managers try to enhance their
own well-being while shareholders try to keep the highest possible expected surplus to
themselves. While the model would have to be altered if it was to focus on the other
types of conicts listed above, the spirit of the exercise would remain the same. Several
avenues may be available to (partially) resolve this conict. We focus on one of them,
by modelling a principal-agent relationship, where the shareholders act as a principal
while managers, as a group, are their agent.
The objective of the agent is the maximization of managers' residual claim, expected
cumulative discounted revenues net of relevant costs, minus transfers to the principal.
The objective of the principal is to maximize a weighted sum of what is left to the agent
and what is transferred to her. It is not crucial for the principal to assign a positive
weight to the objective of the agent. In a crude way, a positive weight may reect the
fact that shareholders often hold administrative positions themselves in other rms, so
that they may show concern for the well-being of managers as a profession, and the fact
that managers usually hold shares in their own company. Both the principal and the
agent have the same discount rate.
Consider the simplest possible technology, giving output at date t as a concave,
dierentiable, positively monotonic function of the stock of capital (time subscripts will
be omitted where no ambiguity arises)
q
t
= g(k
t
)
Capital may be interpreted to include plant and equipment, but also goodwill acquired
through advertising or other marketing expenses, knowhow, the size and training level
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of the labor force, etc.. We assume that g
0
(k) is nite and g (k) is non negative for any
non negative k. Capital evolves according to investment i
t
. For simplicity, assume that
there is no depreciation, so that
k
t+1
= k
t
+ i
t
; k
t
 0 (1)
The cost of investment is assumed to consist of the asset cost of equipment vi, plus a
cost of adjustment which we take to be quadratic: ai+
1
2
bi
2
. Thus, in total, the cost of
an investment i is
[v + a] i+
1
2
bi
2
As argued above, there are several reasons why the agent might prefer the principal
not to know this cost with certainty. There are also several reasons why this cost may
be private information. Consider v. Whether equipment is being sold or purchased,
the transaction price may dier from the posted price by an amount which depends
on the relationship between the parties to the transaction. An extreme case would be
transactions involving kickbacks. Such cost components are likely to be unknown to
the principal, whether it is a board of shareholders or a government. Also, access to
nancing may depend on the relationship between managers and lenders; once nancing
costs are capitalized into the asset price, personal dierences imply that the asset cost
component of the cost of investment is rm specic, possibly unknown to shareholders.
Similarly a may reect rm, or manager, specic inconveniences associated with changes
in size and organization; this is likely to be private information and, as we argue further
below, of interest to the principal. More generally, since expected investment returns
determine the relative cost of investment, assuming that the cost of investment is private
information will serve to model the idea that managers are better informed about both
returns and costs than shareholders.
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Assuming for simplicity that the public information component of v+ a is zero, and
that b is common knowledge, the cost of investment may be written
c (i
t
; 
t
) = 
t
i
t
+
1
2
bi
2
t
(2)
where 
t
> 0 is a privately observed parameter that varies from period to period. This
formulation is also compatible with a focus on the cost of intermediation, as in Bernanke
and Gertler (1989), or Cooper (1994), where variations in the cost of capital accumula-
tion reect uctuations in the frequency of monitoring a representative project. Man-
agers may be better aware of such costs than shareholders
1
.
In order to focus on the eect of asymmetric information on investment decisions,
we eliminate also any common uncertainty: future prices p
t
are known with certainty
and technology does not change over time. These assumptions are inconsequential for
our purposes and have the advantage of simplicity
2
. We also assume that the 's are
uncorrelated over time so that  has the same continuous distribution f () > 0 over the
same interval
h

L
; 
H
i
at all dates. Thus knowing  at any date t does not provide any
information about its subsequent values. This assumption may not be very realistic; it
claries the role of asymmetric information by ensuring that the sole source of dynamics
in the model is the investment process. As in the standard cost of adjustment model
of investment, the sole reason why the decision maker must be forward looking is that
it is innitely costly to change the level of capital instantaneously, and that current
1
Altering Cooper's formulation slightly in order to allow for capital to be durable, we may write
k
t+1
= k
t
+
~
i
t
where
~
 reects the cost of intermediation: a given investment eort may aect the stock
of capital dierently, according to the value of
~
. Allowing for costs of adjustment, the corresponding
cost is vi
t
+
1
2
b [k
t+1
  k
t
]
2
. Consequently, the cost of obtainingk
t+1
given that the current stock is k
t
is
v
~

[k
t+1
  k
t
] +
1
2
b [k
t+1
  k
t
]
2
which is analogous to (2).
2
In the problem presented below, it may alternatively be assumed that future output prices and
technology are stochastic and combine in such a way that net revenues at date t are R (k
t
; 
t
), where

t
follows a Brownian motion. As long as there is no asymmetry in the observation of 
t
, the standard
dynamic programming solution approach will apply in that case and our qualitative results will not be
aected.
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investment decisions aect future capital levels.
The objective of the agent 
t
may be decomposed into current net prot 
t
and
expected cumulative discounted net future prot  
t
fromt + 1 on as evaluated at t.
For the technology just described this means maximizing

t
= 
t
+  
t
= p
t
g (k
t
) 
h

t
i
t
+
1
2
bi
2
t
i
 R
t
+  
t
(k
t+1
)
(3)
subject to (1) whereR
t
is the amount transferred to the principal. R may be thought
of as dividends demanded by the principal.
As explained earlier we assume that one dollar left to the agent is worth ; 0   < 1
to the principal. Thus the principal maximizes


p
t
g (k
t
) 


t
i
t
+
1
2
bi
2
t

 R
t
+  
t

+R
t
+   (k
t+1
) (4)
subject to (1) and the rationality constraint 
t
 0 where   (k
t+1
) is cumulative dis-
counted transfers to the principal from t+ 1 on as expected att.
In the rest of this Section we solve the symmetric information version of this problem.
This solution will serve as a benchmark against which we will compare the solution of
the asymmetric information problem. We will add the superscript s to refer to variables
or functions that are dened or evaluated under symmetric information. Thus the use
of  
s
and  
s
will indicate that the principal is aware that future decisions will be made
in a symmetric information setup.
Under symmetric information  is observed by both the principal and the agent upon
its realization. Since the principal has the power to set R it is obvious that her best
choice at all dates is to setR in such a way that  = 0 leaving the agent indierent
between participating in the relationship or not. Consequently problem (4) is equivalent
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to maximizing by choice of i
p
t
g (k
t
) 


t
i
t
+
1
2
bi
2
t

+  
s
t
(k
t+1
)
subject to (1). This is a simplied but standard version of the cost of adjustment
investment model. The rst-order condition for an interior solution (i
t
>  k
t
) is
i
s
t
=
 
s0
t
  
t
b
(5)
where  
s0
t
is the shadow price of capital the discounted sum of expected future marginal
revenue products. Thus ift happens to be the last period  
s
and its derivatives vanish
so that i is negative: since there is no use keeping any capital for future periods it is
desirable to sell as much of the remaining stock as possible while keeping adjustment
costs to an acceptable level. If instead t is the second last period then keeping a
marginal unit of capital for period t + 1 yields an advantage of  
s0
= p
t+1
g
0
(k
t+1
) in
terms of increased future production where is the discount factor 0<  < 1. This
marginal value product of capital is non stochastic. However suppose now that there
might be yet an extra period t+2; then since
t+1
is unknown i
t+1
which will be given
by (5) at t + 1 is unknown at t; as a result the marginal product ofk
t+2
; g
0
(k
t+2
) is
unknown at t so that the marginal impact on future revenues of increasing the stock of
capital at t is stochastic.
Dene T as the rst interruption in production or equivalently the rst date at
which k is zero
3
. In general T if nite is unknown and stochastic. Then the shadow
3
Depending on the trajectory of p, production may start again after an interruption. However
marginal products in the new production phase will be independent of capital levels before the inter-
ruption, which justies dening T as the rst interruption.
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price of capital at t is under symmetric information
 
s0
t
= E
t
(
T
s
 t
X
=1


p
t+
g
0

k
s
t+

)
As (5) indicates when is high relative to  
s0
it is desirable to sell capital; otherwise it is
desirable to buy. This depends on whether future output prices are high and on expected
future levels of k as they develop when (5) is applied after successive realizations of .
To avoid technical diculties we rule out bubbles that is price trajectories that would
cause  
s0
(and i
s
) to be innite.
3 The model under asymmetric information
3.1 Preliminary remarks
Consider now the asymmetric information case.  is observed upon its realization by
the agent. Consequently the principal must rely on the information given to her by
the agent in order to pursue her objective. Since there is no intertemporal correlation
between the 's the agent does not lose any of his future informational advantage when
he reveals current information to the principal. As a consequence if the principal chooses
to use an incentive mechanism there is no possibility of a ratchet eect as in Laont
and Tirole (1988) and the revelation principle applies as in static setups.
We assume that the principal cannot credibly give up her claim to a share in any
future rents in exchange for a lump-sum payment whose amount would be agreed upon
before future cost conditions are revealed to the agent. This assumption is justied
by wealth constraints on managers. Indeed almost by denition the existence of a
publicly-held rm implies that managerial skills and wealth are held by separate groups
of individuals. We do assume however that the principal is able to commit to one-
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period contracts. Thus, during any period, shareholders will keep the managers if they
receive the dividends and see the action (investment) that were agreed upon.
Under such circumstances, the best the principal can do is to design a succession of
one-period contracts or mechanisms in such a way as to maximize her objective subject
to her informational disadvantage. By the revelation principle, whenever the contracts
discriminate between types,they must induce the agent to reveal his private information,
which requires the properties described below.
3.2 The incentive contract
The incentive contract consists of a menu of investment-transfer pairs
n
i
t

^

t

; R
t

^

t
o
,
where
^

t
represents the level of 
t
announced by the agent when selecting a pair from
the menu. In order to induce truthful revelation at t, the menu must be such that it is
in the interest of the agent to choose
^
 =  8 2
h

L
; 
H
i
. The objective of the agent is
to maximize, by choice of
^



;
^


= pg (k) 

i

^


+
1
2
bi

^


2

 R

^


+  

k + i

^


(6)
where, unless otherwise mentioned, variables (functions) are evaluated (dened) at t.
Dene the optimized value of  as
 () =  (; )
From the rst and second order conditions for the maximization of , we have (Guesnerie
and Laont, 1984)
di
d
 0 (7)
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and
d
d
=  i () (8)
Furthermore as a rationality condition the contract must be such that for any partic-
ipating agent
  0 (9)
Although it is clear from (6) that  is made up of a current component plus a component
corresponding to future prots where both components are net of transfers to share-
holders (9) does not imply a commitment by the principal to keep the same manager in
the future. It implies that if the agent is red at t he gets a compensation of . Our
assumption is that shareholders are able to commit to one period contracts involving
such golden parachutes
4
.
3.3 The problem of the principal
At any date t given k and under constraints (7) (8) and (9) the principal must choose
functions i () and R () in such a way as to maximize
E f() +R () +   (k + i ())g
Substituting the denition of  using (6) and rearranging this is equivalent to choosing
i () in such a way as to maximize
Z

H

L

pg (k)  i () 
1
2
bi ()
2
  [1  ]  () + S (k + i ())

f () d (10)
4
If golden parachutes were not available, a second rationality constraint requiring current net cash
ows  to be non negative would have to be satised. Since  is non negative and  =  +  , that
constraint is at least as strict as (9). Thus golden parachutes allow shareholders to operate in a less
constrained environment.
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subject to (7) (8) and (9) whereS (k + i) dened as  
a
(k + i) + 	
a
(k + i) is the
sum of surpluses to be shared by the agent and the principal at and beyond t+ 1 as
expected at t and discounted to t. As indicated by the superscripts a it is understood
that future decisions will be made in the same asymmetric information setup so that S
reects this knowledge.
5
Problem (10) can be treated as an optimal control problem wherei is the control
variable and where  the state variable is subject to a non negativity constraint. Dene
L (; i; ; ; k) =

pg (k)  i () 
1
2
bi ()
2
  [1   ]  () + S (k + i ())

f ()
  () i () +  ()  () (11)
where   0 and  respectively are the Lagrangian multiplier associated with constraint
(9) and the costate variable associated with . At this stage constraint (7) is being
ignored; we will make use of it in the process of selecting a candidate solution and we will
specify ex post conditions under which it is satised by the unconstrained solution. One
necessary condition the maximum principle implies that at all where i is continuous
and
d
d
exists
i
a
() =
S
0
  
b
 
 ()
bf ()
(12)
where S
0
the shadow value of capital represents the combined value to both the principal
and the agent of expected discounted future marginal products. This rule diers from
its symmetric-information counterpart (5) in two important ways. First since the share
accruing to the principal under symmetric information is the total surplus  
s
in (5) is
the analog of S in (12); however surpluses will normally dier under symmetric and
under asymmetric information as the investment programs implied by (5) and (12) will
5
We assume that S (k
+1
) exists and is continuously dierentiable and concave for any k
+1
 0; this
implies that we rule out price trajectories that would cause S
0
to be innite (as was done with  
s0
under
symmetric information).
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usually dier. Consequently, the rst term on the right-hand side of (5) will normally
dier from the rst term on the right-hand side of (12), although they measure the
same concept. Second, and more familiar, is the presence of an extra term, 
()
bf()
, in
the expression. As in static principal-agent models, this term causes a distortion to
the operative decisions of the agent. As will be shown below, unlike static asymmetric
information production models where agents are typically induced to produce less than
under full information, this term may be positive or negative, causing i to be either
higher, or lower, than under full information. Perhaps more fundamental a dierence
will be the fact, established further below, that the solution is not fully separating under
conventional assumptions on f ().
Another condition, which must hold over intervals where
d
d
exists, is
d
d
= [1  ] f ()   () (13)
Integrating gives
 () = [1   ]F () +A  () (14)
where F is the cumulative distribution of ,A is a constant of integration, and
 () 
Z


L
 ( ) d (15)
measures the cumulative impact on the objective of the principal, of meeting rationality
constraints (9) for all types
~
  .
3.4 Solution
In problems with constraints on the state variables such as (10), discontinuities in costate
variables may occur only at junctions between an interval where the state constraint is
13
binding and an interval where it is not binding
6
. The continuity of  elsewhere will
be useful to characterize the solution. It is also useful to note that the rst two terms
on the right-hand side of (14), together, are strictly increasing in while the last term
goes the opposite way. Thus, on intervals over which  is positive ( = 0), may be
increasing or decreasing; when  = 0, is strictly monotonic; at junctions  may have a
discontinuity. Similarly,  () is continuous as an integral of multipliers and the control
variable i is continuous except, possibly, at junctions between intervals where  = 0 and
intervals where  > 0. Furthermore, given our assumption that S
0
is nite, adjustment
costs imply that i is nite for any ; it follows by (8) that  is continuous over
h

L
; 
H
i
.
Let [
 
; 
+
] 
h

L
; 
H
i
be an interval over which (9) is binding; dene 
 
by the con-
dition that  (
 
) = 0 and, if
 
6= 
L
, then  () > 0 for any  < 
 
in a neighborhood
of 
 
; dene 
+
by the condition that  (
+
) = 0 and, if
+
6= 
H
, then  () > 0 for any
 > 
+
in a neighborhood of 
+
. Thus, locally, [
 
; 
+
] is the largest possible interval
over which (9) is binding; however making the denition local allows for the possibility
that
h

L
; 
H
i
contains zero, one, or several (disjoint) intervals satisfying the denition
of [
 
; 
+
]. By Lemma 1 (see Appendix), one and only one such interval exists; it must
be dierent from
h

L
; 
H
i
.
Depending on the position of [
 
; 
+
] in
h

L
; 
H
i
, the trajectories of  and over
h

L
; 
H
i
must conform to one of ve cases. This is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If it exists, the candidate solution must fall under one of the following
ve cases:
 Case 1: 
 
= 
+
= 
L
;  () = 0 8; () > 0 8 > 
L
; 


L

= 0. In this case:
1.  () is strictly positively monotonic; 


H

= 0;
6
See Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1986, chapter 5). Their suciency conditions for a solution may be ap-
plied in this context. An important characteristic of these conditions is the possibility of discontinuities
in the solution i () and in  () when  = 0.
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2. i () < 0 8;
3. () is strictly positively monotonic.
 Case 2: 
 
= 
L
< 
+
< 
H
; () = 0 8 2
h

L
; 
+
i
;  () = 0 and () >
0; 8 > 
+
. In this case:
1.  () is strictly positively monotonic over ]
+
; 
H
]; 


H

= 0;
2. i () = 0 8 < 
+
; i () < 0 8  
+
;
3. () is strictly positively monotonic 8  
+
.
 Case 3: 
L
< 
 
< 
+
 
H
;  () = 0 and () > 0 8 < 
 
; () = 0 8 2
[
 
; 
+
];  () = 0 and () > 0 8 > 
+
. In this case:
1.  () is strictly positively monotonic over [
L
; 
 
[ and over ]
+
; 
H
]; 


H

=



L

= 0;
2. i () > 0 8  
 
; i () = 0, 
 
<  < 
+
; i () < 0 8  
+
;
3. () is strictly positively (negatively) monotonic 8  
+
( 8  
 
);
4. 
 
6= 
+
.
 Case 4: 
L
< 
 
 
+
= 
H
;  () = 0 and () > 0 8 < 
 
; () = 0; 8 2
h

 
; 
H
i
. In this case:
1.  () is strictly positively monotonic over
h

L
; 
 
i
; 


L

= 0;
2. i () > 0 8  
 
; i () = 0 8 > 
 
;
3. () is strictly negatively monotonic 8  
 
.
 Case 5: 
L
< 
 
= 
+
= 
H
;  () = 0 8; () > 0 8 < 
H
; 


H

= 0. In
this case:
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1.  () is strictly positively monotonic; 


L

= 0;
2. i () > 0 8;
3. () is strictly negatively monotonic.
Proof.
1. In all cases, the monotonicity of  follows from (13) when  = 0, and the values of



H

and (or) 


L

are transversality conditions. In Case 3, (
 
) > 0 follows
from the fact that  strictly rises from 


L

= 0 to  (
 
); similarly, (
+
) < 0
follows from the fact that  strictly rises from  (
+
) to 


H

= 0.
2. In all cases, i () = 0 whenever  () = 0 because of (8). Now we prove that
i () < 0 8 in case 1. Starting from 


L

= 0,  is to become positive; given
(8), it follows that i


L

must be negative; because of (7), i will then remain
negative over the rest of the interval. The sign of i in other cases is established in
a similar way.
3. In all cases, the claimed monotonicity of  is implied by (8) and the sign of i over
the relevant interval.
4. To show that 
 
6= 
+
in case 3, suppose otherwise. Given the monotonicity of 
over [
L
; 
 
[ and over ]
+
; 
H
], and the fact that


H

= 


L

= 0, there must
be a discontinuity in  at 
+
= 
 
, with (
 
) > 0 and  (
+
) < 0; since
@i
a
@
< 0
by (12), it follows that i (
+
) > 0, a contradiction.
Proposition 1 describes the qualitative properties of all possible solutions. The ve
cases are illustrated in Figure 1. Case 1 represents a situation where the interval [
 
; 
+
]
is squeezed to the left of
h

L
; 
H
i
and is actually reduced to 
L
. In other cases, the
interval is progressively shifted to the right, so that case 5 represents a situation where the
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interval is reduced to 
H
. For each case, the gure gives the optimal investment, prot,
and shadow price of prot satisfying the qualitative properties stated in Proposition 1.
As will be shown below, these situations occur according to the magnitude ofS
0
. To
complete the characterization, we pick a candidate solution that assumes the absence of
any discontinuities in  at 
+
and 
 
, and we verify that it satises all other conditions
in Seierstad and Sydsaeter's suciency theorem, allowing us to conclude that it solves
problem (10). By Lemma 2 (see Appendix), such a solution exists if f satises the
following assumption.
Assumption 1 f has the following properties:
l () 
1  F ()
f ()
is non increasing
h() 
F ()
f ()
is non decreasing
The solution is described in the following propositions, proven in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 If  () is continuous over
h

L
; 
H
i
, it is given, in cases 1-3 and 4-5
respectively, by
 () = [1   ]F ()  [1  ] + 


+

 () (16)
and
 () = [1   ]F () () (17)
where  () = 0 8 in cases 1 and 5, while, in cases 2 and 3,  () = 0 8  
 
,
 () =  (
+
),   
+
, and, for 
 
<  < 
+
 () =
"
[1  ]
F ()  1
f ()
  [S
0
  ] +
 (
+
)
f ()
#
f () (18)
with  (
+
) =
h
S
0
  
L
i
f


L

+ [1  ] in case 2 and  (
+
) = [1  ] in case 3. In
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case 4
 () =
"
[1   ]
F ()
f ()
  [S
0
  ]
#
f () (19)
The function  in Proposition 2 is well dened. However, by its denition (15), it
must also be increasing. Lemma 2 ensures that this is true.
Proposition 1 does not dene 
 
and 
+
when they are in the interior of
h

L
; 
H
i
.
This is done in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If  () is continuous over
h

L
; 
H
i
, in cases 3 and 4, 
 
is dened by
the condition
0 =
h
S
0
  
 
i
f


 

  [1  ]F


 

(20)
In cases 2 and 3, 
+
is dened by the condition
0 =
h
S
0
  
+
i
f


+

  [1   ]F


+

+ 1   (21)
Proposition 3 denes 
 
and 
+
implicitly. By Lemma 2, when they exist within the
interval
h

L
; 
H
i
, they also satisfy
 
< 
+
. The next proposition species the values of
the shadow price of capital that cause each of the ve cases to arise.
Proposition 4 Let S
0
1
< 
L
and S
0
4
> 
H
be respectively dened by
0 =
h
S
0
1
  
L
i
f


L

+ 1   (22)
and
0 =
h
S
0
4
  
H
i
f


H

  [1   ] (23)
Then cases 1-5 arise according to the value of S
0
relative to S
0
1
, 
L
, 
H
and S
0
4
:
 Case 1 corresponds to: S
0
 S
0
1
< 
L
;
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 Case 2 corresponds to: S
0
1
< S
0
 
L
;
 Case 3 corresponds to: 
L
 
 
 S
0
 
+
 
H
where the left two inequalities
are strict unless S
0
= 
L
and the right two inequalities are strict unless S
0
= 
H
;
 Case 4 corresponds to: 
H
< S
0
< S
0
4
;
 Case 5 corresponds to: S
0
 S
0
4
> 
H
.
The candidate solution described in propositions 1-4 exists since it was obtained by
construction. It satises all conditions for an optimum except that (7) was not imposed
that the monotonicity of  was not veried and that the condition
 
< 
+
was not
veried. By Lemma 2 Assumption 1 is sucient for these properties to be satised.
4 Discussion
The optimal program under asymmetric information diers notably from its full infor-
mation counterpart. The most visible dierence is the pooling phase (at i = 0) that
occurs between negative and positive investment regimes under asymmetric informa-
tion. Under symmetric information as (5) clearly shows investment is positive if  
s0
the marginal value of capital in terms of expected discounted future surpluses is higher
than  and vice versa; there is no interval of  between the two regimes over which i = 0.
Informational asymmetry usually introduces ineciency under assumptions similar to
those made here but without causing such pooling. What happens here is that there is a
conict between two incentives to misrepresent . A manager whose  would place him
in the category of capital buyers under full information has an incentive to overstate
 in order to overstate his cost of buying; but too big an overstatement might place
him in a high  group of types who should normally sell capital under full information.
However for sellers the incentive to misrepresent goes in the opposite direction: they
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should understate  to understate their revenues from selling. Managers whose  is close
to S
0
, the marginal value of capital at which investment would switch from negative
to positive under full information, would face such a dilemma. Precisely, all types in
[
 
; 
+
] face that dilemma, which is resolved by asking them not to invest. This situation
involving conicting incentives is an example of `Inexible Rules in Incentive Problems'
as analyzed by Lewis and Sappington (1989). It arises here naturally rather than being
engineered by a principal in order to alleviate an incentive problem as in their case.
For types whose cost of capital is close to the S
0
, the loss from settingi = 0 is low
relative to the saving that such ineciency allows in the cost of inducing more protable
types to reveal their true . Such protable types may occur at both ends of the 
spectrum, with prots being generated either by buying (low ), or selling (high )
capital. Taking Case 3 as an example, this appears more clearly if (12) is written (using
Proposition 2) in the following form
 + bi () =
8
>
>
<
>
:
S
0
+ [1   ] l() ;   
+
S
0
  [1   ]h() ;   
 
(24)
The left-hand side is the cost of the marginal unit of capital, inclusive of its adjustment
cost component. For rms at either end of
h

L
; 
H
i
, the second term on the right-hand
side of the appropriate line vanishes, implying that marginal cost is set equal toS
0
. This
is indeed the same rule as under full information, (misleadingly) suggesting that types

L
and 
H
are asked to behave eciently. Since S
0
2 [
 
; 
+
] (Proposition 4),
L
< S
0
and 
H
> S
0
, so that this rule requires low  types to buy capital and high  types to sell.
In contrast, types whose  is closer to S
0
are being asked to deviate from that rule by an
amount proportional to l or h. Since l is non increasing and non positive, andh is non
decreasing and non negative, the wedge is wider, the closer is to the relevant switching
value (
 
or 
+
). This is illustrated in Figure 2 for a uniform distribution of  over [1; 2]
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with b = 1. Applying rule (24) beyond type 
+
(
 
) would imply requesting a positive
(negative) investment from a type that would be asked to sell (buy) capital under full
information at identical marginal value of capital. The optimal contract reects the fact
that it is less costly in terms of eciency loss to choose pooling instead in the vicinity
of S
0
. Thus there is a third instance of (apparent) ecient behavior: when  is equal to
S
0
the agent invests zero as would be the case under full information.
As hinted above one would be mistaken to believe that types 
L

H
andS
0
are
asked to invest as under full information. Although the rule is the same as under full
information for these types there is ineciency arising from the fact that at any given
k S
0
diers from its full information counterpart  
s0
. This dierence appears because
whatever its current type there is a strictly positive probability (unless T is known to
be within two periods) that in the future an agent will be asked to invest a dierent
amount than would be warranted under symmetric information.
The distinction between S
0
and  
s0
also has implications for interpreting Tobin's
q. Under symmetric information according to theq theory of investment the stock
exchange valuation V of a rm provides a measure of the total value of its assets. Under
appropriate assumptions (Hayashi 1982; Abel and Eberly 1994) this also applies at
the margin so that
V
k
provides a measure of the contribution to V of the marginal (and
average) unit of capital as it is perceived by the market
7
. In our notation
V
k
would then
provide a measure of  
s0
. According to the q theory investment should be chosen in such
a way as to equate the marginal cost of acquiring one unit of capital with  
s0
and the
unobserved  
s0
should be replaced with
V
k
in the investment equation: bi
s
t
+ =
V
k
where
 is interpreted to include the market purchase price p
K
. Under asymmetric information
the shadow price of capital S
0
cannot be measured in the same way: the reason is that
S is a surplus to be shared between the principal and the agent (S   
a
+  
a
) while
7
The identication of marginal q with average q is a restriction that can be circumvented; see Abel
and Blanchard (1986). This does not aect our argument.
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the stock exchange measures only the portion  
a
that accrues to the principal under
asymmetric information. Furthermore it is clear in our simple specication of the
asymmetric information model that the relative size of  
a
and  
a
is sensitive to the
parameters of the problem. Consequently the proportional error made by measuring S
using stock exchange valuation is likely to be highly variable both across rms across
sectors and over time
8
. This might be yet another explanation for the lack of reliability
of q models of investment. In fact there is evidence that Tobin's q as measured by the
ratio of  
a
over the replacement cost of tangible assets might be sensitive to information
asymmetries. The literature on diversication and performance provides evidence that
Tobin's q is negatively correlated with the degree of diversication when diversication
is into unrelated businesses. This evidence is discussed and complemented by Lang and
Stulz (1994). It may imply that agency costs are higher in rms that diversify into
unrelated business than in more focused rms (i.e. S <  
s
) but also that the share ofS
appropriable by shareholders  
a
which is what markets measure is lower in unfocused
rms than in focused ones.
As was mentioned earlier the qualitative nature of our results is unaected if  is
dened to include besides an idiosyncratic component the observable asset price of
equipment p
K
. The pooling that occurs under asymmetric information provides a new
explanation for investment to be insensitive to variations in the cost of capital and in
the shadow value of capital over certain ranges. Abel and Eberly (1994) summarize
conditions under which the standard cost of adjustment model of investment involves
i = 0 over an asset price region. In the absence of any non negativity constraint
one possibility is the presence of a xed cost for any non zero level of investment; in
that case however there are discontinuities in the optimal investment function which
do not arise in our model. Another possibility is the presence of a kink in the cost
8
There is evidence of such variability in the recent empirical literature. See Demers et al. (1994).
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of investment function at i = 0, either due to the dierent nature of negative, versus
positive, investment, or to a dierence between purchase and resale prices. Here, there
is no discontinuity in the optimal investment function so that its qualitative properties,
as a relationship between investment and its cost, are similar to the properties ofi
a
.
Although not distinguishable in that respect, the two models dier in the investment
uncertainty relationship. This is discussed further below.
Besides the standard neoclassical theory of investment, the optimality of not reacting
to a changing environment, over a certain range, has been identied and discussed in a
growing literature on hysteresis. As far as investment theory is concerned, this literature
is best presented in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Faced with an irreversible decision to take
under uncertainty, rms value positively the option of waiting for more information. This
introduces a wedge, the option value, between the cost of investment and its expected
marginal product value. This option value explains why, over a certain range, rms
optimally choose not to react to variations in the cost of investment or in the expected
marginal product value. As when xed costs are associated with non null investment
levels, which indeed makes the investment decision irreversible, there are discontinuities
between inaction regimes and regimes of active investment, as opposed to the asymmetric
information model.
Thus our model implies an observationally dierent investment behavior than the
most well-known alternatives. One apparent exception is the cost-of-adjustment model
when there is a kink in the cost of adjustment at i = 0. Both models imply inaction over
some range in the cost of capital or its shadow value, and a progressive departure, with-
out discontinuity, from that situation at values outside the inaction range. However,
the two models dier in the way investment is aected by uncertainty. Comparisons
are not straightforward though, because the types of uncertainties envisaged in both
models are somewhat dierent: uncertainty about future capital productivity in the
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standard cost of adjustment model; uncertainty about the current cost of capital in the
asymmetric information model. In the asymmetric information model, an increase in un-
certainty, taking the form of a wider spread in the distribution of, will normally reduce
the absolute value of investment, as illustrated in Figure 3 for the uniform distribu-
tion. In contrast, in the kinked cost-of-adjustment model, the result of Abel (1983) and
Caballero (1991) apply: they nd that increased uncertainty increases the investment
of competitive rms with constant returns to scale, at least when the random shocks
are idiosyncratic to individual rms, as they are in our model. Such reversals in the
positive correlation between uncertainty and investment as implied by our asymmetric
information model have been encountered in other contexts, and discussed extensively
by Caballero. He observes that adjustment-cost asymmetry, combined with imperfect
competition, produce this reversal in symmetric information models, underlining that
imperfect competition \is also the paramount factor". Our model exhibits this property
without adjustment-cost asymmetry or imperfect competition.
5 Conclusion
Investment theory, especially the body of literature underlying the study of business xed
investment spending, largely neglects issues of agency and information. In this paper,
we have introduced asymmetry of information between shareholders and managers into
an otherwise standard cost of adjustment model of investment.
This produces an investment equation with clearly distinguishable features. The
most remarkable one is a new form of hysteresis which results from conicting incentives
to misrepresent costs for certain types. Hysteresis arises when the conict is resolved
by the use of an inexible rule as in Lewis and Sappington (1989). Departures from
the inaction regime are smooth as in the model of Abel and Eberley (1994) involving
adjustment costs with a kink at i = 0. However, their model can be distinguished from
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ours by the nature and role of uncertainty.
Our model also casts a new light on the q theory of investment. It shows that, if
information asymmetries are present, the shadow value of capital should be dened to
include rents accruing to managers. Failing that,q is poorly and inconsistently measured.
From the point of view of agency theory, the investment model turns out to have
interesting peculiarities. First, our model introduces a form of dynamics which has
been neglected sofar in principal-agent models, although it is standard in other elds of
economics. The intertemporal link is provided by capital and investment, but might as
well involve learning by doing or R&D. At rst sight, this type of dynamics does not
appear to aect the result, pervasive in static agency theory, according to which the
behavior of `good' types is the same as under full information. Thus the lowest-cost
manager is asked to chose i so as to equate marginal cost to the shadow price of capital
as under full information. However, since there is a positive probability of not being
lowest-cost in some future period, distortions will occur in the future almost certainly,
so that the shadow price of capital is dierent than under full information: the same
investment rule yields a dierent investment level.
Second, depending on the cost of capital, positive or negative investment may be
desirable to shareholders and managers. As a result `good' types, to whom a full infor-
mation investment rule applies, may coexist at both ends of the type range.
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LEMMAS AND PROOFS
9
A Lemma 1
Lemma 1 There exists one and only one interval [
 
; 
+
], possibly reduced to a single
point but necessarily dierent from
h

L
; 
H
i
.
Proof. In order to show that there exists at least one interval, we show that  > 0 8
is impossible. Suppose that  > 0 8; then  is continuous over
h

L
; 
H
i
and, by
(14), is strictly monotonic. However the transversality conditions corresponding to



L

> 0 and 


H

> 0, 


L

= 0 and 


H

= 0 respectively, cannot be
both satised by a monotonic, continuous trajectory. Now suppose that there is more
than one interval satisfying the denition of [
 
; 
+
]; by denition the intervals must
be separated by intervals over which  > 0; thus there exists 
1
< 
2
< 
3
such
that  (
1
) = 0,  (
2
) > 0, and  (
3
) = 0. Consequently, as  increases from

1
to 
3
, the continuous function  () must rst rise, which requires i < 0 by (8),
then diminish, which requires i > 0. This violates (7). It remains to show that
[
 
; 
+
] is dierent from
h

L
; 
H
i
. Suppose otherwise; then, by (8), in order to main-
tain  = 0 over the whole interval, i = 0 8. Since the objective to maximize
is
R

H

L
n
pg (k)  i () 
1
2
bi ()
2
  [1   ]  () + S (k + i ())
o
f () d, and since either
S
0
(k + i ()) > 
L
, orS
0
(k + i ()) < 
H
, or both, the programi =  = 0 8 may be
strictly improved, either (a) by setting i > 0 over a neighborhood of 
L
, or (b) by setting
i < 0 over a neighborhood of 
H
, or both. Let us show that this is feasible under the
constraints imposed by asymmetric information. Thus suppose (a) applies and choose
9
Propositions or Lemmas are stated in the Appendix only if they are not stated in the main text.
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some i
1
> 0, > 0, and 
1
such that, for 2
h

L
;
1
i
, the dierence between the
contribution of the perturbed program and the original candidate satises
10
pg (k)  i
1
 
1
2
bi
2
1
  [1   ] 
1
() + S (k + i
1
)  pg (k)  S (k) >  > 0
where 
1
() is such that (8) is satised and 
1
(
1
) = 0: 
1
() = 
L
  i
1
. The
principal may ask agents of type  < 
1
to set i = i
1
, oering them 
1
(), rather than
asking them to set i = 0 and oering them  = 0. They will nd it in their interest to
accept, each yielding an increment of at least  to the objective of the principal. Thus
i = 0 =  8 cannot be optimal, implying that [
 
; 
+
] 
h

L
; 
H
i
.
B Proposition 2
We start from (14) and use the transversality conditions corresponding to each case in
order to eliminate the constant of integration A. The assumed continuity of  implies
that there is only one such constant of integration in each case. In cases 1-3, 


H

is
free, so that


H

= 0; (14) implies
A = 


H

  [1  ]
Substituting into (14), recognizing that 


H

= (
+
), gives (16). In cases 4-5, 


L

is free, so that


L

= 0; it follows from (14) that A = 0 which in turn implies (17).
 () = 0 by denition in cases 1 and 5. In cases 2 and 3, 
+
< 
H
, so that,
by denition,  () =  (
+
) 8   
+
. For   
 
, by denition,  () = 0. For
10
if no such triplet
 
i
1
;
1
;

may be found, then it is certain that a similar triplet corresponding to
(b),i
2
< 0, 
2
, > 0 can be found such that, for 2


2
; 
H

pg (k)  i
2
 
1
2
bi
2
2
  [1  ]
2
() + S (k + i
2
)  pg (k)  S (k) >  > 0
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 
<  < 
+
, by Proposition 1,i = 0, which implies, substituting (16) into (12)
0 =
1
b
(
[S
0
  ] 
[1  ] [F ()  1] +  (
+
)   ()
f ()
)
from which (18) follows.  (
+
) is obtained as follows. In case 2, writing (18) at
 
= 
L
,
with  (
 
) = 0 by denition, gives  (
+
) =
h
S
0
  
L
i
f


L

+ [1   ]. In case 3, since



L

is free, we further have, as a transversality condition, that


L

= 0. Writing
(16) at 
L
, with 


L

= (
 
) = 0 by denition, yields  (
+
) = [1   ].
We turn to establishing (19): this is done by substituting (17) into (12), and setting
i
a
= 0.
C Proposition 3
Since 
 
is the lowest level of  at which constraint (9) is binding,  (
 
) = 0. By
Proposition 1, at
 
, i = 0. Writing (12) at 
 
, while substituting the formulas for
 and  given in Proposition 2 for cases 3 and 4, implies, in both cases, that
 
must
satisfy
0 =
1
b
(
h
S
0
  
 
i
 
[1   ]F (
 
)
f (
 
)
)
which reduces to (20). Similarly, by Proposition 1, at
+
,i = 0. Writing (12) at 
+
,
while substituting the formulas for  and  given in Proposition 2 for cases 2 and 3,
implies, in both cases, that
+
must satisfy
0 =
1
b
(
h
S
0
  
+
i
 
[1  ]F (
+
)  [1   ]
f (
+
)
)
which reduces to (21).
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D Proposition 4
It is useful to refer to Figure 1 in order to see how the various cases are related to each
other. The switch from Case 1 to Case 2 occurs when the value S
0
1
of S
0
is such that 
L
solves the denition of 
+
, i.e. when
0 =
h
S
0
1
  
L
i
f


L

+ 1  
This implies S
0
1
< 
L
. The switch between Case 2 and Case 3 occurs when the value S
0
2
of S
0
is such that 
L
solves the denition of 
 
0 =
h
S
0
2
  
L
i
f


L

(25)
which implies S
0
2
= 
L
. The switch between Case 3 and Case 4 occurs when the value
S
0
3
of S
0
is such that 
H
solves the denition of 
+
0 =
h
S
0
3
  
H
i
f


H

(26)
which implies S
0
3
= 
H
. The switch between Case 4 and Case 5 occurs when value S
0
4
of
S
0
is such that 
H
solves the denition of 
 
0 =
h
S
0
4
  
H
i
f


H

  [1  ]
which implies S
0
4
> 
H
.
In cases 2 and 3, (21) applies; it follows that S
0
 
+
and that the inequality is strict
unless 
+
= 
H
; similarly, in cases 3 and 4, (20) impliesS
0
 
 
and the inequality is
strict unless 
 
= 
L
.
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E Lemma 2
Lemma 2 A sucient condition for the candidate solution described in propositions 1-4
to solve the principal's problem is for f to satisfy Assumption 1.
Proof. The candidate solution described in propositions 1-4 exists since it was obtained
by construction. It satises all conditions for an optimum except that (7) was not
imposed, that the monotonicity of  was not veried, and that the condition
 
< 
+
was not veried. We have to show that these last three properties are veried. When i
is constant at zero, (7) is satised. Let us consider other situations. We start with Case
1, as well as cases 2 and 3 for   
+
. Substituting the appropriate values of  and 
from Proposition 2 into (12)
i () =
1
b
"
S
0
   + [1  ]
1   F ()
f ()
#
Since
1 F ()
f()
 l () ; a sucient condition for
di
d
 0 is l to be non increasing. The
other cases where i is non constant are cases 3 and 4, for  
 
, and Case 5. After
appropriate substitutions, (12) gives
i () =
1
b
"
S
0
     [1  ]
F ()
f ()
#
Since
F ()
f()
 h (), a sucient condition for
di
d
 0 is f to be non decreasing.
It is immediate to verify, using (18), that the monotonicity of  is implied by the
monotonicity of l in cases 2 and 3, while, in case 4, it is implied by (19) and the
monotonicity of h. Similarly, it can be veried using (20) or (21) that the monotonicity
of h implies 
 
< 
+
.
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Figure 1: Optimal investment, profit, and shadow price of profit
Case 2: S’1 <S’< θL
Case 3: θL < S’< θΗ
Case 4: θH < S’< S’4
Case 5: S’4 < S’
Case 1: S’< S’1
θH
Π
θ+
µ i
S’4S’1
θL θH
µ Π
θ+θ−
i
S’4S’1
θL θH
Π µ
θ−
i
S’4S’1
θL θH
µΠ
i
S’4S’1
θL θH
µ
Π
i
S’4S’1
θL
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
Investment i
C
ostofca
p
ita
l θ
Figure 2: Inverse investment demand curve: asymmetric information (continuous line)
and symmetric information (dotted line), S’= 1.4
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Figure 3: Investment as a function of S’ under asymmetric information: high uncertainty
(dotted line) and low uncertainty (continuous line), q = 1.2
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